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The Four Points of the Compass1
JAMES ALEXANDER
Abstract
Philosophy has four forms: wonder, faith, doubt and scepticism. These are not sep-
arate categories, but separate ideal possibilities. Modern academic philosophy has
fallen, for several centuries, into an error: which is the error of supposing that phil-
osophy is only what I call doubt. Philosophy may be doubt: indeed, it is part of my
argument that this is undeniably one element of, or one possibility in, philosophy;
but doubt is only one of four points of the compass. In this essay I indicate the
nature of each point of the compass as it has been found in the history of philosophy.
Philosophy is no longer, if it ever was, simply philosophy. It is, and
has been since Hegel, a recapitulation of the entirety of the history of
philosophy – even if a philosopher resist this truth, as Heidegger did,
or ignore it, as Wittgenstein did. Deleuze and Guattari recently
suggested that philosophy is ‘the coexistence of planes, not the suc-
cession of systems’.2 If this is so, it seems valuable – at a time when
philosophy is usually studied from within the middle of its own pro-
blems – to attempt to put forward a capacious account of what phil-
osophy is – one which, I argue, can do justice to the varieties of
philosophy seen in the entirety of history.
It is worth beginning with what philosophy is not.
Once upon a time all the world spoke a single language and used
the same words. As men journeyed in the east, they came upon a
plain in the land of Shinar and settled there. They said to one
another, ‘Come, let us make bricks and bake them hard’; they
used bricks for stone and bitumen for mortar. ‘Come’, they
said, ‘let us build ourselves a city and a tower with its top in
the heavens, and make a name for ourselves; or we shall be dis-
persed all over the earth.’ Then the LORD came down to see the
city and tower which mortal men had built, and he said, ‘Here
1 This essay, written in Downing College, Cambridge in April 2011, is
indebted to the writings cited below, but perhaps especially to the writings
of D.C. Stove and S.R.L. Clark. They have suggested to me that breadth is
still possible in modern philosophy – something I had begun to doubt.
2 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press,
1994), 59.
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they are, one people with a single language, and now they have
started to do this; henceforward nothing they have a mind to
do will be beyond their reach. Come, let us go down there and
confuse their speech, so that they will not understand what
they say to one another.’ So the LORD dispersed them from
there all over the earth, and they left off building the city. That
is why it is called Babel, because the LORD there made a babble
of the language of all the world; from that place the LORD scat-
tered men all over the face of the earth.’3
If I may use elements of this famous story as a parable, here we have
themost distinctive elements of the human condition. AsArendt puts
it, we labour to achieve the ends which enable us to survive, we work
to create artefacts to dignify and decorate our world, and we act in
concert in such a way to perpetuate the distinctively human world
through ‘word and deed’.4 She distinguished three sorts of activity:
labour (browsing, boiling, baking, burning etc), work (building
etc) and action (babbling). Throughout this essay I will refer to
‘browsing, building and babbling’ to express the entirety of this
vita activa. I associate all of them with Babel.
Philosophy is the attempt to avoid the fate of Babel.5 God scattered
men all over the earth; and so all of the earth became a Babel.
Throughout history some of us have used a compass to indicate the
way out of Babel. This compass is called philosophy, for want of a
better word, and it has four points.
3 Gen. 11.1–9 (New English Bible).
4 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958).
5 Oakeshott characterised philosophy as ‘perhaps the only complete
escape there is’. See Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 3.
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InBabel we are concernedwith browsing, building and babbling. In
philosophy we are not. The word philosophia is derived from the
Socratic or Platonic sense that this Pythagorean word was a better
word for the conscientious activity they were concerned with than
the word sophia itself. The wisdom of the Sophists was a worldly
sort of wisdom, the wisdom of Babel. If sophia was worldly wisdom,
a preparation for life, then philosophiawas unworldly wisdom, a prep-
aration for death: it somehow involved what should be known by any
human who wanted to get beyond the accidental world. The philoso-
pher may always find himself back in Babel. If the philosopher
builds too high, or becomes concerned with glory, then he finds he
has achieved nothing but his own confusion: he has become one of
the scattered humans, browsing, building and babbling over the
surface of the earth, banished by God from the one – presumably
sacred – language. The ambition of the philosopher is to speak the
language of the gods, or to be a god, or to render gods unnecessary.
1. Wonder
Wonder is the simplest point of the compass. It is the encounter
between a self and the world: but this self is stripped of its inclination
to browse, build or babble: it has no purposes, no motives except
some strange, apparently ‘divine’, purpose or motive to see and to
know. The world is what is seen and known. But it is seen as if for
the first time, as if by a god: it is seen by a human who has no
purpose, and has assumed the conscientious posture of already
being dead – in the sense of being beyond life – and then sees what
this world is. He wants to see it or know it in its truth. And in this
first, pure, moment of philosophical experience, he simply sees it
for what it is. In a state of wonder, the philosopher abstracts
himself from his own concerns. The world is no longer a place of
partial adventures but an entire condition, immediate, without a
beyond. To attempt to abstract oneself from one’s own purposes
abstracts the self into a state of wonder, where the world – formerly
a world of causes and conditions and consequences – is now simply
a vast image or set of images. There is no purpose, no motive, no
interest. There is simply what there is. The best way to express this
clearly is to say that it is where what seems to be and what is are the
same.
Socrates famously suggested that philosophy began in wonder or
‘thaumazein’. When Theaeteus confessed he was ‘lost in wonder’,
Socrates said: ‘The feeling of wonder shows that you are a
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philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy.’6
Aristotle repeated this view: ‘It is through wonder that men now
begin and at first began to philosophise; wondering in the first
place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression
raising questions about the greater matters too.’7 But perhaps Stove
was right to say that ‘philosophy typically begins in pseudo-wonder,
expressed by asking questions which are really no questions at all.’8
For I am not arguing here that wonder is the origin of philosophy
but that wonder is itself a form of philosophy.
It is not original to say so. Heidegger famously attempted to wind
back philosophy to where it was before Socrates.9 Or where it was for
Socrates himself. When he was late on one occasion, Aristodemus ex-
plained to friends: ‘No, let him alone; it is a habit he has. Occasionally
he turns aside, anywhere at random, and there he stands. He will be
here presently, I expect. So do not disturb him; let him be.’10 For
some of them the sight of Socrates in a state of wonder was itself a
cause of wonder. Plato tells us that the Ionians ‘brought out their
mattresses and rugs and took their sleep in the cool; thus they
wanted to see if he would go on standing all night too’. And, we are
told, in a still beautiful image, ‘He stood till dawn came and the
sun rose; then walked away, after offering a prayer to the Sun.’11
Socrates never said what such wonder was like. The Socratic dialo-
gues were, as Stove suggests, exercises in pseudo-wonder rather than
in wonder itself. So we have to look elsewhere for a characterisation.
6 Plato, Theaetetus 155c–d, in the Loeb edition trans. H.N. Fowler
(Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1921), 55.
7 Aristotle, Metaphysics 982b, in the Loeb edition trans. Hugh
Tredennick (Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933), 13. See
Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (London: Secker and Warburg,
1978), Vol. I, 141.
8 David Stove, The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1991), 69.
9 This is the line of thought followed inMary-Jane Rubinstein, Strange
Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2008). See also Kenneth L. Schmitz, The
Recovery of Wonder: The New Freedom and the Asceticism of Power
(London: Queen’s University Press, 2005).
10 Plato, Symposium 175b, in the Loeb edition trans. W.R.M. Lamb
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1925), 91.
11 Ibid., 220d, in the Loeb, 239. For the two other senses in which
Socrates was ‘silent’ see Alexander Nehemas, ‘Voices of Silence: On
George Vlastos’s Socrates’, Virtues of Authenticity: Essays On Plato and
Socrates (Princeton, 1999), 83–107.
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Descartes, who was for obvious reasons not particularly interested in
wonder, characterised it as
a sudden surprise of the soul which brings it to consider with at-
tention the objects that seem to it unusual and extraordinary. It
has two causes: first, an impression in the brain, which represents
the object as something unusual and consequently worthy of
special consideration; and secondly, a movement of the spirits,
which the impression disposes both to flow with great force to
the place in the brain where it is located so as to strength and pre-
serve it there, and also to pass into the muscles which serve to
keep the sense organs fixed in the same orientation so that they
will continue to maintain the impression in the way in which
they formed it.12
This was meant to be a psychological analysis of wonder. But
Heidegger took wonder to be of fundamental existential significance.
When we step outside the immediate activity of browsing, building
and babbling, and no longer look at the world in order to achieve
our ends, but look at it for its, or our, own sake, we experience
wonder. Heidegger called this ‘curiosity’, or Neugier, and said it
was ‘the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be en-
countered by us in perception’.13 When we are finished with work we
rest and see ‘the “world”merely as it looks’: we allow ourselves to ‘be
carried along solely by the looks of the world.’14 For Heidegger this
wonder gives us ‘primordial and genuine truth’.15 ‘Man alone of all
beings, when addressed by the voice of Being, experiences the
marvel of all marvels, that what-is is.’16 Truth – and this cannot be
the usual sense of truth as opposed to falsity but a unitary truth
which is before and beyond truth – cannot take propositional form:
on the contrary, it is simply ‘the unconcealment and revealment of
what-is’.17 Heidegger was in his writing concerned with the difficulty
we have relating our abstract sense of totality (Sein) to our individual
12 René Descartes, ‘The Passions of the Soul’, The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes trans. John Cottingham et al (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985–91), Vol. I, 353.
13 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time trans. John MacQuarrie and
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 214.
14 Ibid., 216.
15 Ibid., 215.
16 Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’, Existence and Being
(London: Vision, 1956), 386.
17 Martin Heidegger, ‘On the Essence of Truth’, Existence and Being,
336.
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lives in Babel (Dasein). And he called this particular frame of mind
Verhaltenheit, a form of wonder which carries with it the meaning
of terror and awe.18 Needless to say, this is not what I mean by
wonder, which is only the apprehension of what is.
Heidegger attempted to say something about the unsayable, but
Wittgenstein simply gestured at it. ‘There are, indeed, things
which cannot be put into words,’ he wrote. ‘They make themselves
manifest. They are what is mystical.’19 Or, as he put it in the
famous closing line of the Tractatus, ‘Wovon man nicht sprechen
kann, daruber muss man schweigen’.20 It is hard not to agree with
Williams that something fundamental was expressed here: that, in
the twentieth century, some philosophers considered that philosophy
might not be the attempt to escape from ignorance, but might be
ignorance itself, the speechlessness which comes whenever we en-
counter whatever is the case.21 Then it would be wholly separate
from knowledge. ‘Deny it as we may, knowledge and wonder coun-
teract one another,’wrote Lawrence. ‘So that as knowledge increases,
wonder decreases.’22
If we want to avoid Heideggerian heightening, or Wittgensteinian
pathos, then it is possible to characterise wonder as the fundamental
form of experience conceived in terms of ideas. If I suppose – as all
idealists have – that experience is one, and that there is no difference
between what experiences and what is experienced, then the simplest
form experience could take would be one in which experience is un-
derstood to be what it seems to be. Collingwood in Speculum Mentis
offered us the clearest characterisation of this sort of experience: ‘aes-
thetic experience cares nothing for the reality or unreality of its
object. It is neither true nor false: it simply ignores the distinction…
Its apparent assertions are not real assertions but the very suspension
of assertion.’23 Wonder is ‘question without answer’: it makes no dis-
tinction between what is imaginary and what is real. The imaginary is
18 Rubinstein, op. cit. note 9, 34.
19 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus trans. D.F. Pears
and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 6.522,
151.
20 Ibid., 7, 151.
21 BernardWilliams, ‘Philosophy and the Understanding of Ignorance’
(1995), Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (Princeton, 2006), 169–79, at
169.
22 D.H. Lawrence, ‘Hymns in aMan’s Life’,Selected Literary Criticism
(London: Heinemann, 1956), 7.
23 R.G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, or the Map of Knowledge
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 60.
84
James Alexander
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819111000568
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 02 Feb 2017 at 04:37:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
the real, the real is the imaginary: what is seen, is. ‘It is.’ We escape
from Babel into Socratic silence. ‘The world of imagination is a
private world, a world inhabited solely by its author.’ And to experi-
ence wonder is to have an ‘attitude which neither asserts reality, truly
or falsely, nor denies it, but merely imagines’.24
In wonder there is no truth beyond the world. The philosopher, in
a state of wonder, simply sees the world for what it is. What is is what
seems to be, and what seems to be is what is. This is Socrates’ thauma-
zein: a form of contemplation, not of Platonic ideas beyond this
world, but of the images experienced in this world. Oakeshott
thought this was ‘all that can, in the end, survive of the Platonic con-
ception of theoria’.25 My own view is that Collingwood was wrong to
suggest that this sort of experience is question without answer. If
wonder lacks answers, then it necessarily lacks questions.26
Questions postulate answers: but wonder is not interested in
answers, and therefore is not aware of questions. It is a world of
silence. And this is because, in wonder, experiencer and experienced
are one, and together constitute experience. Subject and object are
transcended, and so unity is experienced.
In a sense, then, wonder is passive. But there is no reason why phil-
osophy has to be active. In faith, too, as we shall see, philosophy is a
passivity rather than an activity. This is why the activity which
Socrates and Aristotle in their different ways engaged in was not
wonder. For philosophy in the usual active sense emerges when we
experience the world in wonder, and then ask a question. The ques-
tion arises because our consciousness suggests to us that what is is not
what seems to be: and so we ask the question ‘What is if what is is not
what it seems to be?’ Since questions are not found in wonder, this
question is put by Babel. If we hear the question, and attempt to
answer it without returning to Babel, then we move to one of the
other points of the philosophical compass.
There is, then, a discontinuity between wonder and the other three
points of the compass. As soon as we distinguish truth and falsity, or,
what is the same thing, as soon as we ask questions, then we see that
philosophy is more than mere wonder. Schopenhauer spoke of our
‘metaphysical need’, the fundamental human need for ‘knowledge
that goes beyond the possibility of experience, and so beyond
24 Ibid., 76.
25 Oakeshott, ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’,
Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1962), 220.
26 ‘…a question [can] only [exist] where an answer exists…’
Wittgenstein, op. cit. note 19, 6.51, 149.
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nature of the given phenomenal appearance of things, in order to give
information about that by which, in some sense of other, this experi-
ence of nature is conditioned’.27 This need is a consequence of our ex-
isting in Babel, among words. It follows what we could call the
Parmenidean moment when the wordless recognition of wonder is
put into words. The most famous fragment of Parmenides is the
line saying: ‘[It] is, and it cannot be that [it] is not.’28 Santayana com-
mented that it is possible to ‘contemplate’ existence ‘without belief’
but that ‘when I assert that such a thing exists I am hypostatizing
this datum, placing it in presumptive relations which are not internal
to it, and worshipping it as an idol or thing’.29 This is the
Parmenidean moment, when the veil of experience is torn by utter-
ance, so that the world divides into the word which is uttered and
the world which it is uttered of. At this moment philosophy is no
longer silent consciousness but a consciousness through words.
E pur si muove. And this is why philosophers at the other points of
the compass are more likely to return to Babel.
2. Faith
Faith is the second point of the compass of philosophy. Babel is a
world of many words, of man unsure of his speech, of endless soph-
istry. But perhaps in this condition we may hear a word which is the
truth of the world: a truth which we have sought but not been able to
find in our own words.We say, ‘It is’ and immediately doubt, and ask
‘Is it?’ and thenwemay hear aword, ‘IT IS’. And this word is certain:
and it is certain because it is not human – it has not emerged from the
arguments of the sophists – but has come from somewhere else, from
the beyond, from something which is beyond or behind the world
itself – from the divine. And because this truth is divine, it is
certain: it is one, and we have to believe it. This response is faith,
and it gives us a form of philosophy in which all thought is under-
stood in relation to one revealed word.
27 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation trans.
E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), Vol. II, 164.
28 Quoted in BernardWilliams, ‘TheLegacy ofGreek Philosophy’,The
Sense of the Past: Essays in The History of Philosophy ed. Myles Burnyeat
(Princeton, 2000), 3–48.
29 George Santayana, Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a
System of Philosophy (London: Constable, 1923), 35.
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As soon as we have a word of all words, a logos which stands
opposed to the world, there is a division. And this is why faith is
more complicated than wonder: for where wonder is the experience
of unity, faith is the experience of division. The word is some
unitary truth which, opposed to theworld, completes, explains, sanc-
tifies it. As this word is a unity, it is absolutely authoritative: it has
authority, and our response to it is belief, or faith: what the Greeks
called pistis and the Latins fides. But since the word has come into
the world, it divides the world into two. The word comes from
beyond, or behind, the world: and our usual word for this is God.
The Abrahamic religions – Judaism, Christianity, Islam – have
made the most of this understanding, although it is also evident else-
where, in all other religions and in much philosophy. This problem,
which is the problem of faith, is the problem of how to explain the
separation of word and world: how to explain the fact that what is
is divided into appearance and reality: that is, into what seems to be
and what is – or, as is usually said, what really is.
We can distinguish, perhaps, two sorts of faith. One is relative, the
other absolute. The relative form of faith is the sort of faith we find in
rational religion, natural religion, and Neoplatonic or Hegelian
thought: in which we suppose there is a ‘divine’ truth which is
somehow hidden by but also existing within the world as we experi-
ence it. This is a relative sort of faith because it tends to involve
elements of doubt: that is, it postulates that there is something
about our place within this world which makes it possible for us to es-
tablish the truth which is not the obvious simple truth of experience.
It is immanentist. But the other, absolute, form of faith, is the pure
form of faith: and it is where there is no dependence on reason at
all, only on faith. It is transcendental. Here there is a relation, as
Buber put it, not between I and It – where ‘It’ may be the truth of
the world, the One or the Absolute – but between I and Thou.
These two forms of faith are what Kierkegaard distinguished as ‘re-
ligiousness of immanence’ and ‘paradoxical religiousness’.30 Others
call them religions of reason and revelation. The latter is the pure
form of faith – and consequently more difficult to explain.
This form of faith comes to its highest manifestation in the
Abrahamic religions. In the Old Testament God’s word was first
manifest in the covenant (berith) with the Israelites, and established
in the law (torah). The Old Testament itself was, as Balthasar
30 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical
Crumbs trans. Alastair Hannay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 465 & 468.
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explained, ‘history, which convicts man as a sinner and confrontsGod
with the fact of the broken covenant’.31 In Christianity and Islam,
therefore, the word was spoken for a second time: for Christians as
a ‘new fact’, and for Muslims as a ‘new text’.32 Christianity claimed
that the word of God was not the law but the man who came to
fulfil the law.33 And Islam claimed that the word of God was a
final word of law in the form of the Qu’ran revealed to the Prophet.
Christianity is the more perplexing. For in Christianity the word,
the logos, was God himself. ‘In the beginning was the word.’ The
kérygma, proclamation – or didaché, teaching, apokalypseos, revel-
ation, evangelion, gospel – of Christianity was not any of Jesus’s
words but Jesus himself, the ‘word made flesh’.34 The word was
not an idea but an event: that God loved us, and had shown this
love by coming to earth, suffering everything, even crucifixion.35
This event required faith, for, as Kierkegaard said, ‘the understand-
ing cannot come to know this by itself’.36
Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? [wrote
Paul] For seeing that in the wisdom of God the world through
its wisdom knew not God, it was God’s good pleasure through
the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe.
Seeing that Jews ask for signs, and Greeks seek after wisdom:
but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-
block, and unto Gentiles foolishness;… God chose the foolish
things of the world, that he might put to shame the wise.37
And Tertullian claimed, ‘Certum, quia impossibile…’: ‘it is certain,
because impossible’.38 This is the contradiction which has
31 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological
Aesthetics 1961–7 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1982–91), Vol. VI, 215.
32 Rémi Brague, The Law of God: The Philosophical History of an Idea
trans. Lydia Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 97.
33 See Hebrews 4.12 for ‘alive and active’, Matthew 5.17–19 for the ful-
fillment of the law, and John 1.1. for the famous logos doctrine.
34 See Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament eds. Horst Balz and
Gerhard Schneider (T. and T. Clark, 1990), Vol. II, 288–92.
35 Constantine Constantius, Repetition: An Essay in Experimental
Psychology 1843 trans. by M.G. Piety in Repetition and Philosophical
Crumbs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 107.
36 Ibid., 119.
37 1 Cor. 1.21–27 (King James Version).
38 Tertullian, de carne Christi, 5. See Tertullian’s Treatise on the
Incarnation ed. Ernest Evans (London: S.P.C.K., 1950), 19.
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accompanied faith down the ages: that the truth of faith is ‘something
which, for all its incomprehensibility, is still comprehensible’.39
The problem of faith is how something not of this world can come
into this world. The word divides the world into good and evil, true
and false etc. But it raises the problem of how a single, eternal and un-
changing God can have a relation to the world. McTaggart argued
that if God causes change, and the law of causation is that anything
which causes change is itself changed, then a changeless God could
not come into the world. ‘We must therefore suppose that God
causes change without changing.’40 For McTaggart this and other
contradictions made faith untenable. ‘Most people have no right to
accept any religion as true’.41
But this could never be the end of the discussion. For within faith –
as within scepticism – a contradiction is not a refutation. ‘It is
absurd,’ said Tertullian, ‘so I believe it.’ Williams, when reflecting
on Tertullian’s claim, commented that there is ‘a sort of inherent
and necessary incomprehensibility, which seems to be a feature of
Christian belief’. He added: ‘If the Christian faith is true, it must
be partly incomprehensible, but if it is partly incomprehensible, it
is difficult to see what it is for it to be true.’42 McTaggart and
Williams came to an impasse because they considered faith from
the point of view of doubt. But within faith the contradiction may
be embraced. According to Soloviev, ‘The truly one is that which
does not exclude plurality, but on the contrary produces that plurality
within itself and yet is by nomeans changed by it, but remains what it
is, remains one and thereby proves that it is unconditionally one.’43
Of course, to state a contradiction is not to understand it. But
Collingwood saw, as McTaggart did not, that the correct way of un-
derstanding faith is to see that it is not expressed in terms of claims
such as ‘God exists’, but in terms of claims such as Credo in unum
deum, or ‘I believe God exists’. For Collingwood one could never
treat ‘God exists’ as a proposition.44
39 Karl Barth, ‘Bultmann –An Attempt to Understand Him’,Kerygma
and Myth: A Theological Debate trans. Reginald H. Fuller (London:
S.P.C.K., 1962), 83–132 at 99.
40 J.M.E. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion (London: Edward
Arnold, 1906), 194.
41 Ibid., 293.
42 Bernard Williams, ‘Tertullian’s Paradox’ (1955), in op. cit. note 21,
3–21, at 3, 20.
43 Vladimir Solovyov, Lectures on Godmanhood ed. Peter Zouboff
(London: Dennis Dobson, 1948), 133.
44 R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940), 188.
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The absurdity of Christ crucified – or even of Yahweh or Allah
uttering the word of law – can never be overcome through
reason.45 For this absurdity is the absolute limit of faith, just as
logical paradox is for scepticism. Doubt, as we shall see, denies
the existence of both absurdity and paradox: it demands consist-
ency, and sees only contradiction, and understanding contradiction
as reductio ad absurdum. But faith depends on a word which both
can and cannot be understood. If it cannot be understood, we
cannot have faith; but if it can be understood, then it can be trans-
lated: but it is of the nature of faith – any faith – that it is beyond
translation. Collingwood, again, put this most clearly. ‘Religion
cannot translate itself not because it has no meaning, for it has a
very definite meaning, to elicit which is the progressive task of
theology and philosophy; but because, although it has a meaning
and knows that it has a meaning, it thinks it has expressed this
meaning already.’46 So the word of Christianity is Christ crucified,
and – despite Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach and
the rest – this is a word which does not become truer when it is ex-
pressed in terms of reason. It has to remain beyond reason in order
to be the word it claims to be.47
The strength of faith is that it offers certainty, a certainty which
doubt seems to fail to establish, and which scepticism denies can
ever be established. Theologians sometimes claim that faith is re-
quired to support our knowledge of the external world.
That anything exists outside of ourselves and independently of
ourselves – that we cannot know, because all that we know (actu-
ally), that is to say, all that we experience, exists within us, not
outside of us (as our sensations and our thoughts); and what is
not within us, but is in its own self, is thereby beyond the limits
of our experience and, consequently, outside of our actual knowl-
edge; it can be asserted, thus, only by an act of the spirit which
can reach beyond the boundaries of this reality of ours – and it
is this act of the spirit which is called faith.48
45 Not even by advocating a ‘dual-aspect doctrine of God’. See Keith
Ward, Images of Eternity: Concepts of God in Five Religious Traditions
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1987), 153–63.
46 Collingwood, op. cit. note 23, 130.
47 For the rejection of the entire tradition of Schleiermacher, Harnack,
Ritschl and Troeltsch see Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The
Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge (London: S.C.M., 1947).
48 Solovyov, op. cit. note 43, 91.
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MacIntyre thinks many philosophers do not understand what faith
involves. Atheists assume ‘a theist is someone who believes in just
one more being than they do and who therefore has the responsibility
for justifying her or his belief in this extra entity’. But atheists have
‘misconceived both God and theistic belief in God’. For a theist,
God is not an addition to nature; but a ground of nature: nature
itself is ‘radically incomplete’, and requires a ‘ground beyond itself’
if it is to be intelligible. So it follows that ‘the disagreement
between atheists and theists is one of those fundamental disagree-
ments that extends to how the disagreement is to be characterised.’49
God is a postulate of this form of philosophy. Whitehead wrote:
God is the ultimate limitation, and this existence is the ultimate
irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation
which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete,
but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No occasion can be
given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground
of rationality.50
Clark has gone further by claiming that not only God but also the
Trinity and the Incarnation are necessary postulates of reason. If
there is truth at all, he claims, then it depends on an absolute truth.
He argues that beyond the finite world there is an infinite and necess-
ary entity, that this entity – God – has to be known by us, and that
God had to become human and suffer as Jesus did in order to make
faith possible.51 Clark’s arguments are, interestingly, as
MacIntyre’s are, for faith rather than from faith. He is very careful,
for instance, to say that there is no reason why the mediator needed
to be the historical Jesus.52 So even here, where there is a
maximum of argument, there is in the end an acknowledgement
that in faith reason is eventually inevitably dependent on revelation.
The God of faith is both the root of every existent thing and one
among many.
Both MacIntyre and Clark write as far as they can about revelation
in terms of reason – about faith in terms of doubt. But Collingwood
49 Alasdair MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities: A Selective
History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition (London: Continuum,
2009), 47.
50 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1927), 221–2.
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was right. Faith in the end cannot be translated into doubt. This is
why it is usually ignored by modern academic philosophers. They
trust reason, not revelation. ‘The statements made by religion are
often false, or at least doubtful,’ said Collingwood. ‘But religion is
committed to asserting them as true.’53 This is the characteristic
voice of doubt, the next point of the compass.
3. Doubt
Doubt is logically subsequent to faith. We exist in a world, and
experience wonder, which is silent. Words return us to Babel. But
if we hear a word which is certain we can avoid Babel by responding
to this word of all words with faith. But a further question can arise,
which again may return us to Babel, which is how we can know that
this word rather than any other is the word of all words. This is the
beginning of doubt – the dubium we experience when truth is
divided. It leads us to ask the question Russell asked in the first sen-
tence of his Problems of Philosophy: ‘Is there any knowledge in the
world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?’54
In faith there is no difference between what I believe and what I
know; but when we experience doubt we feel the absolute imperative
to distinguish them. And for this we need some sort of certain cri-
terion of truth, a means of demonstration – in short, a method.
Doubt is the attempt to establish what can be known by considering
every possibility until what cannot be doubted is left as what is
certain. It is, then, philosophy at the third point of the compass –
philosophy as an activity, the human activity, of attempting to estab-
lish certainty.
Doubt is a consequence of our hearing differing, contradictory,
truths. We hear the truth of Christ crucified, but we then hear the
truths of the Torah and the Qur’an, the truths of Buddhism,
Brahmanism and Daoism, the truths of Platonism, Aristotelianism,
Cynicism, Stoicism, Scepticism, Epicureanism, Thomism,
Empiricism, Kantianism, Utilitarianism, Hegelianism, Marxism,
Nietzscheanism, Darwinism, Freudianism, Wittgensteinianism,
Liberalism, Socialism, Conservativism etc. Here, we may well
suppose we have returned to Babel. And this confusion of tongues –
which is a confusion of truths, of words – is the origin of doubt.
53 Collingwood, op. cit. note 23, 130.
54 Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 1.
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For doubt is not itself the disturbancewhich results fromhearing differ-
ent words, but the manifest response to this. Newman explained that
‘doubt itself is a positive idea, and implies a definite habit of mind,
and thereby necessarily involves a system of principles and doctrines
all its own.’55 The most important of these principles is that
doubt postulates certainty. ‘If you tried to doubt everything’, wrote
Wittgenstein, ‘you would not get as far as doubting everything – the
game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.’56
Doubt submits everything to a humanmethod of rational interrog-
ation. But it also postulates the existence of a certainty more certain
than the certainty of faith – a certainty known through demon-
stration. This is not a divine, given, truth – revealed – but a
human, acquired, truth – reasoned, indeed, argued. If there is any-
thing ubiquitous in philosophical doubt it is argument. The
dialektiké of Plato, the syllogismos of Aristotle, the quaestiones of
Aquinas, the méthode of Descartes were all about argument: the
idea that one would begin with propositions, which were themselves
susceptible of exposure to doubt, and then derive indubitable infer-
ences from them. Most philosophy now is still conducted in the
great shadows of these monuments of argument. But it is important
to note here that these philosophers were concerned not only with
what we might call the absolute certainties of philosophy but with
the certainties associated with any successful demonstration. The
branch of philosophy called ‘natural philosophy’ – the sciences
associated with what Plato called hypothetical knowledge – has had
so much success with a doubtful method, especially in the last five
hundred years, that many modern philosophers are only dimly
aware that there are other points of the compass.
The are two levels at which doubt seeks certainty: at what we may
call the absolute, unconditional, or unhypothetical level, and at the
relative, conditional, or hypothetical level. The success of Aristotle,
Eratosthenes, Copernicus, Bacon, Galileo, Boyle, Hooke, Watt,
Lyell, Darwin, Agassiz and so on – a long list – in the sciences ob-
scures the extent to which certainty is still sought at a higher level:
and, importantly, that certainty has to be sought at a higher level if
we are to be sure that the certainties of the sciences are certain. The
problem goes right back to Socrates. He was executed for leading
55 J.H.Newman,AnEssay inAid of a Grammar of Assent ed. Ian T.Ker
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 243.
56 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and
G.K. von Wright. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, sect. 115, 18e, repeated
in sect. 122, 18e, sect. 160, 23e, sect. 346, 44e, sect 354, 46e.
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others into doubt. ‘It is not from any sureness in myself that I cause
others to doubt,’ he told Meno. ‘It is from being in more doubt than
anyone else that I cause doubt in others.’57 Plato suggested certain
models of dialectical method to overcome doubt. The scholars still
seem to agree that there were three major sorts of method advocated
in his dialogues: i. the early Socratic method of elenchus, of question
and answer, that is, taking suggestions and refuting them, a process
which usually ended in aporia or impasse – where the problem was
to try to establish the idea of something which was to be understood;
ii. the method of hypothesis, used from the Meno and Phaedo
onwards, in which propositions were laid down about what was to
be understood in terms of ideas – a generally deductive and construc-
tive method which ended in discussion of the nature of ideas them-
selves; and iii. the later method of collection and division, found
from the Phaedrus onwards, in which the ideas themselves were
classified in terms of various ordering principles.58 But in the
Republic Plato arranged the different levels of knowledge into a hier-
archy and declared that the highest was the sort of knowledge which
originates from an anupothetos arché, a non-hypothetical first prin-
ciple, and therefore is absolutely certain. The next was hypothetical
knowledge, that is, knowledge which begins with a hypothesis, and
so is never more than relatively certain. Lower was faith, and even
lower still was illusion. There was never a problem with hypothetical
knowledge, which is the sort of knowledge everyone understands; but
Plato never said what unhypothetical knowledge was. All we can
assume is that it was some sort of absolute limit or origin. It was poss-
ibly the subject of Plato’s lecture on the ‘One’ and the ‘Great and
Small’ which disconcerted Plato’s students, including Aristotle,
and still disconcerts philosophers now.59
What philosophers of doubt since Descartes have sought is a
hypothesis which will be as certain as an unhypothesised first prin-
ciple. Descartes wanted to see if he could ‘reject as if absolutely
false everything in which [he] could imagine the least doubt, in
order to see if [he] was left believing anything that was entirely
57 Plato,Meno 80c–d, in the Loeb edition trans. W.R.M. Lamb (Camb.
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1924), 299.
58 Richard Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialogues (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell UP, 1941), repeated in J.D.G. Evans, A Plato Primer (Durham:
Acumen, 2010), 65–83.
59 Although not J.N. Findlay, Plato: The Written and Unwritten
Doctrines (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).
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indubitable’.60 He was open to the possibility that doubt might make
certainty impossible. In the Meditations he said, ‘Anything which
admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it
to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognise
something certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least recognise for
certain that there is no certainty.’61 But, as Williams put it,
‘Descartes was not a sceptic.’62 He thought that doubt itself could
be elevated into a basis of a certainty which could defeat doubt; for,
as he argued, it was impossible to doubt that one doubts. And ‘I
doubt, therefore I am’ was warrant for ‘I think, therefore I am’.
If this argument established the self, Descartes unfortunately, as
we all know, argued for the certainty of everything else from the exist-
ence of God. Although he claimed in the Principles of Philosophy that
‘we must first of all lay aside all our preconceived opinions, or at least
we must take the greatest care not to put our trust in any of the
opinions accepted by us in the past until we have first scrutinised
them afresh and confirmed their truth’, he also claimed that ‘what-
ever God has revealed to us must be accepted as more certain than
anything else’ for ‘although the light of reason may, with the
utmost clarity and evidence, appear to suggest something different,
we must still put our entire faith in divine authority rather than in
our own judgement’.63 His entire philosophical system – his claim
that the external world actually exists – depended on what Williams
called a ‘religious bridge’, and collapses immediately if God’s exist-
ence is believed not to be beyond doubt.64 This has been a great
problem for doubting philosophy ever since. Until at least Berkeley
and possibly as late as Bradley, philosophers found it hard to avoid
appealing to God, or some surrogate for God in the form of an
‘Absolute’, to save doubt from scepticism.
Deduction and induction are an argumentative machinery of for-
midable power – as the history of mathematics and the sciences
since Descartes and Bacon suggests – but it remains as difficult as
ever to show why there is any reason to suppose that deduction
60 René Descartes, ‘Discourse on the Method’, The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes, Vol. I, 144.
61 René Descartes, ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’, The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. II, 16.
62 Bernard Williams, ‘Descartes’s Use of Scepticism’, in op. cit. note
28, 231–45, at 232.
63 René Descartes, ‘Principles of Philosophy’, The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes, Vol. I, 221.
64 Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Sussex:
Harvester, 1978), 153.
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generates certainty about what is necessary or why induction gener-
ates certainty about what is contingent. In the first half of his life
Russell sought certainty in mathematics, butWittgenstein convinced
him that he had found ‘tautology’ rather than ‘truth’.65 In the second
half of his life he sought certainty about the world, but all he found
was a ‘probability’ which ‘approaches indefinitely near to cer-
tainty’.66 He objected to scepticism, saying, ‘Universal scepticism
cannot be refuted, but also cannot be accepted.’67 But in his last
major original work he declared that ‘all human knowledge is uncer-
tain, inexact and partial’. ‘To this doctrine,’ he added, ‘we have not
found any limitations whatever.’68 He continued to think that the cer-
tainties of science have ‘a higher degree of probability than anything
likely to be achieved in philosophical speculation’.69 And he ended
his life still claiming – by ignoring Gödel’s incompleteness theorem –
that ‘certainty is more likely to be found in mathematics than else-
where.’70 All Russell could demonstrate was that certainties are either
hypothetical or probable.
Almost everyone since Plato has struggled to indicate how we can
achieve anything more than hypothetical certainties through deduc-
tion or probable certainties through induction. Some have argued
that we cannot have certainty without faith. Newman, for instance,
argued that doubt could deliver only hypothetical certainties. He dis-
tinguished two types of assent to propositions, ‘notional assent’ and
‘real assent’. Notional assent is the acceptance of an abstract prop-
osition, where we assent to the proposition without assenting to its
presuppositions. If we want, we may assent to those presuppositions,
by yet another notional assent. Real assent, however, is assent to a
proposition, where it is condition of assent that we assent to all of
its presuppositions.71 In notional assent we move from proposition
to proposition, from postulate to postulate, without ever achieving
certainty, but in real assent we avoid an infinite regress and achieve
certainty. In other words, Newman thought that there was a distinct
65 Bertrand Russell,MyPhilosophical Development (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1959), 210–11.
66 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World: As a Field
for Science Method in Philosophy (London: Open Court, 1914), 222.
67 Russell, op. cit. note 65, 207.
68 Bertrand Russell,Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1948), 507.
69 Russell, op. cit. note 65.
70 Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1969), Vol. III, 223.
71 Newman, op. cit. note 55, 54–5.
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logic of faith, whereby one accepts a word in its totality, as opposed to
a distinct logic of what is here called doubt, whereby one accepts
words conditionally, through reason, examining every step of an argu-
ment. He declared that without assent – in either of these forms – ‘we
have no intellectualmoorings, and are at themercy of impulses, fancies
and wandering lights’.72 Doubt was a genuine part of philosophy but
could not supply the certainty of faith.
Newman was influenced by Hume; and Russell, like most of us,
could not get beyond Hume. Hume is still famous for his argument
that induction cannot demonstrate the certainty of anything. The
only way that induction can be defended is to claim that the certainty
demanded by Hume was simply too great for induction to bear.73
But, as everyone knows, Hume was not himself a sceptic. ‘To
Hume it seemed madness to renounce the principles, the Principle
of the Uniformity of Nature, for example, or the Law of Causality,
simply because the fraudulence of all claims for their rational validity
had been exposed. If such principles expressed logically unjustifiable
assumptions, they also represented psychologically necessary ones for
imposing order and intelligibility upon the world in which men have
to think in order to survive.’74 Humewas, in the end, a philosopher of
doubt, content with relative certainties. He wanted a system ‘which if
not true (for that, perhaps is too much to be hop’d for) might at least
be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the
most critical examination’.75
The greatest achievement of the philosophy of doubt may be the
tradition of ‘common sense’ which comes down from Reid through
Hamilton, Moore and Stove. Reid thought that philosophy ‘has no
other root but the principles of common sense’. We have to take
them for granted; we can give no reason for them: and ‘what is mani-
festly contrary to them, is what we call absurd’. It followed that if a
man ‘suffers himself to be reasoned out of the principles of
common sense, by metaphysical arguments, we may call this meta-
physical lunacy.’76 Reid thought that the arguments of most
72 Ibid., 63.
73 See David Stove, Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists
(Oxford: Pergamon, 1982), 56–84.
74 James Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development: A Study of His
Methods (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 10.
75 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 272.
76 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of
Common Sense ed. Derek Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1997), 19, 33, 215–16, quoted in Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Reid on
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philosophers from Plato to Hume naturally led to scepticism and ‘the
destruction to all science and common sense’.77 He argued against it,
interestingly, by claiming that philosophers often postulated
unnecessary entities such as ideas. Doubtless our mind has its own
activity, but it is worthless explaining that activity by adding
another type of object, an idea, to the objects we are conscious of.
Reid thought it was remarkable that the theory of ideas had ‘been
so universally received by philosophers, that it was thought to need
no proof’. ‘I cannot help thinking that the whole history of philos-
ophy has never furnished an instance of an opinion so unanimously
entertained by Philosophers upon so slight grounds.’78 Stove was
even more scathing about this argument, which is, he suggested, an
argument which illegitimately argues from necessity to contingency.
The argument that
We can know things only as they are known to us
Therefore
We cannot know things as they are in themselves79
is ‘contemptible’ because it claims that ‘our knowledge is not real
knowledge at all, because it is our knowledge’.80 To Stove, an unre-
pentant philosopher of doubt, this proves that ‘there is something
fearfully wrong with typical philosophical theories’.81 But if this is
so, then doubt empties out philosophy completely by suggesting
that there is no other experience but that of Babel. Philosophers are
still divided on this question. Some say that philosophy should deal
with the ‘obvious’ while others still maintain it should deal with
the ‘unobvious’.82 But doubt has obvious problems with both the
obvious and the unobvious.
Common Sense’, inThe Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 77, 85, 87.
77 Reid, Inquiry, 75, quoted in John Greco, ‘Reid’s Reply to the
Skeptic’, Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, 135.
78 Reid, Inquiry, 75, and Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers
of Man ed. Derek Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002),
183–4, quoted in Greco, ‘Reid’s Reply’, 140.
79 Stove, op. cit. note 8, 165.
80 Ibid., 161.
81 Ibid., xi.
82 For the ‘obvious’ see Bernard Williams, ‘What Might Philosophy
Become?’, in op. cit. note 21, 200–23, at 213. For the ‘unobvious’ see
Anthony Kenny, ‘Philosophy States Only What Everyone Admits’, From
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Doubt has greater achievements to show that any other form of
philosophy, but they are achievements of relative not absolute cer-
tainty. They may only be so many towers of Babel. Wittgenstein in
On Certainty admitted that it was difficult to distinguish ‘I know’
and ‘I believe’.83 He wondered whether, in the end, certainty
might be nothing other than a ‘tone of voice’.84 If it were so, then
the judgement would have to be that doubt would only doubtfully
be a point of the philosophical compass at all. And as soon as we
doubt doubt we are led back to the stranger but more secure certain-
ties of wonder and faith or on to that of scepticism.
4. Scepticism
The four points of the compass are distinct but there is obviously a
logic to their arrangement. We encounter a world; then we encounter
a word which explains the world but also divides it; then we attempt
to overcome division by establishing a hierarchy of words; and,
finally, we come to the judgement that words cannot be formed
into a hierarchy: that, in fact, the only certainty about words (or the
world) is that there is no certainty. This is scepticism, the fourth
point of the compass. It is in a sense formally the same as doubt
but it is doubt completed; and doubt completed is not doubt: for if
doubt is completed then it doubts that there is certainty; whereas,
as I have shown, it is the fundamental postulate of doubt that there
is a certainty which can be established through some method or
other. Here we alter direction completely: for although we are, in
scepticism, still committed to rational argument, it has a different
purpose. So far we have reached the boundary of rational argument,
which is the telos of doubt: but the telos of scepticism is beyond this
boundary. And so we go beyond diction to contradiction.
Doubt seeks the end of argument but scepticism seeks the end
beyond argument. Doubt postulates certainty, scepticism does not.
There is no better explanation of this than Hegel’s.
We must not translate skepsis as ‘doctrine of doubt’ or ‘seeking to
doubt’. Scepticism is not a doubt, for doubt is the very opposite
of the tranquillity that ought to be Scepticism’s result. ‘Doubt’
Empedocles to Wittgenstein: Historical Essays in Philosophy (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2008), 136–48, at 143.
83 See Wittgenstein, op. cit. note 56, sect. 3, 2e and sect. 8, 3e.
84 Ibid., sect. 30, 6e.
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[Zweifel] derives from zwei; it is a vacillation between two or
more points; a person settles upon neither the one nor the
other and yet should settle upon one of the other, even though
each is doubted… This standpoint of doubt is the opposite of
Scepticism. Doubt is restless because it wants to find rest in
something set in opposition to rest, and can find it nowhere.
Scepticism, however, is equally indifferent to the one and to
the other, and does not wish to find security in one of the
opposed elements. This is Scepticism’s standpoint of ataraxia.85
Doubt assumes that we can infer what is from what seems, and that
there is a criterion of truth. Scepticism assumes that we cannot infer
what is from what seems and that any criterion of truth requires, for
its truth, a further criterion which leads us into an infinite regress
and thus problems of fundamental contradiction.86 The only cer-
tainty in scepticism is the certainty – if it is a certainty – that cer-
tainty cannot be known. Doubt is not fully consistent, since it
seeks a certainty it cannot find. And so scepticism completes
doubt, by declaring that the principle of doubt must be applied
to itself. But doubt cannot really deal with the paradoxes and con-
tradictions encountered here. Doubt can only deal with a contradic-
tion by solving it, or resolving it: that is, by translating it into
something which is not a paradox but a mere doxa. But this
usually fails. The fate of Frege’s and Russell’s mathematical logic
is only the most recent testimony of this. Doubt dislikes paradox
because a paradox is, in effect, a reductio ad absurdum. But scepti-
cism, which does not postulate certainty, or unity of understanding,
as its achievement, can consider that paradoxes and contradictions
are constitutive of whatever truth there is to be had about words and
world. So scepticism is a genuinely distinct point of the philosophi-
cal compass.
It is common now for writers to distinguish ancient and modern
scepticism.87 But although some of the differences between them
are interesting – especially the classical view that scepticism culmi-
nates in a way of life – they are all variants of an inclination to
accept the paradoxes which come at the limits of thought. Zeno’s
85 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6 ed.
Robert F. Brown, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), Vol. II, 307–08.
86 Diogenes Laertius,Lives of the Philosophers, 9.94, in the Loeb edition
trans. R.D. Hicks (Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), Vol. II,
507.
87 See for instance Julia Anna and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes of
Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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argument for the unreality of movement, Anselm’s argument for the
existence of God, Berkeley’s argument for idealism, McTaggart’s ar-
gument for the unreality of time, are all masterpieces of sceptical
thought. They are often taken to be paradigmatic of what philosophy
is: but they are typical only of sceptical philosophy. They are all med-
itations on certainty: and tend to generate problems for us only if we
want to establish certainty. Even Descartes’ Meditations can be read
as a study of paradox rather than a resolution of it. Santayana said
that sceptics assume that ‘all knowledge’ is ‘faith only’: so that ‘an
existing world’ is ‘a questionable and arbitrary thing’.88 The
sceptic is willing to doubt that there is a world, or words, or anything.
He agrees with Newman that doubt requires notional assent and can
never command real assent, but then adds that real assent is beyond
human capacity. So we have to recognise, as Oakeshott recognised,
that ‘all understandings are conditional’.89 The difference between
modern and ancient scepticism is whether we think that our recognis-
ing this is a positive achievement or not. Moderns think it is not; an-
cients, like Pyrrho and Sextus, thought it was.
The greatest philosophers tended to suppose that scepticism is irre-
futable – and that it simply has to be ignored, as Aristotle or Hume
ignored it. Hegel locked scepticism into his system as an element of
its dialectic.90 But most modern philosophers, committed to doubt,
still find it necessary to refute or rebut scepticism. The usual way to
refute scepticism is to say that it refutes itself. For instance, it is said
that to claim ‘There is no truth’ is to claim ‘The truth is that there is
no truth’, which is a contradiction.91 Or that to claim ‘There is no
truth’ requires us to claim the equal and opposite belief ‘There is a
truth’, which again is a contradiction. Grayling, in his Refutation of
Scepticism, claims that ‘scepticism is idle because we cannot help but
believe in the existence of objects; … this belief is so fundamental
that it is senseless or futile to call it into question.’92 This does not
sound like a refutation. And there is usually no reason to think scepti-
cism has been refuted – because sceptics do not suppose that
88 Santayana, op. cit. note 29, 49.
89 Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1975), 98.
90 Kenneth R. Westphal, Hegel’s Epistemological Realism: A Study of
the Aim and Method of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic, 1989), 11.
91 Used by Stephen Clark in God’s World and the Great Awakening
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 23.
92 A.C. Grayling, The Refutation of Scepticism (London: Duckworth,
1985), 77.
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contradiction is refutation.93 Arendt rightly recognized that ‘nobody
who clings fast to the motion that “there is no truth”, will ever be con-
vinced if it is pointed out to him that the proposition is self-defeating’.94
Most philosophers would now most likely agree with Strawson that
Stroud was right to say that even a transcendental argument cannot
refute scepticism and that, as Hume supposed, there are two different
levels of thought, one which is concerned with absolutes, where scepti-
cism is irrefutable, and one concernedwith relatives, where scepticism is
irrelevant.95 But even Sextus orNagarjunawould have agreedwith this.
They never supposed that scepticism denied the existence of Babel.
Scepticism is far from simple. It may range from the extremes
where we say ‘nothing is true’ or ‘everything is true’ to a complete
logic of scepticism according to which questions about ultimates, ab-
solutes, or universals are answered by saying that everything is, is not,
both is and is not, and neither is nor is not.96 This logical form, the
tetralemma, is first mentioned in our tradition in relation to the teach-
ing of Pyrrho, the founder of scepticism.
[Pyrrho] reveals that things are equally indifferent and unstable
and indeterminate: for this reason neither our sensations nor our
opinions tell the truth or lie. For this reason, then, we should
not trust them, but should be without opinions and without incli-
nations and without wavering, saying about each single thing that
it nomore is than is not or both is and is not or neithers nor is not.97
93 For themost elaborate exploration ofwhy this is so seeLucaCastagnoli,
Ancient Self-Refutation: The Logic andHistory of the Self-Refutation Argument
fromDemocritus to Augustine (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2010),
esp. 307–07.Theonlyphilosopher Ihave readwhodoes consider the scepticism
in all its subtlety and yet considers it fails isGrahamPriest,Beyond the Limits of
Thought 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 42–55.
94 Arendt, op. cit. note 7, 149–50.
95 See P.F. Strawson, Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties
(London: Methuen, 1985). See also Barry Stroud, The Significance of
Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
96 See Priest, who calls these respectively ‘scepticism’ (‘nothing is true’),
‘trivialism’ (‘everything is true’), and ‘dialethism’: which last is his word for
his own doctrine that our usual philosophy of doubt breaks down at the
limits of thought. Priest is doubtful whether anyone has subscribed to ‘trivial-
ism’. He suggests perhaps Anaxagoras did, and adds that Aristotle thought
Heraclitus and Protagoras did. See Priest, op. cit. note 93, 12 & 65.
97 Eusebius, quoting Aristocles, quoting Timon, in Richard Bett,
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There are two possible interpretations here: either Pyrrho advocated a
subjective scepticism –where one is sceptical of words since one sup-
poses they say nothing certain about the world – or an objective scep-
ticism – where one is sceptical about the truth of any word about the
world because the world is itself paradoxical so that ‘it is, is not, both
is and is not, and neither is nor is not’.98 The former is only logical,
the latter ontological. Some sceptics, like Sextus, thought it very
important to distinguish the two. But it seems here that in the end
whether scepticism is about words or about the world makes no
difference: the oscillation is part of the paradox embraced by
scepticism.
According to Sextus, the sceptics were to be distinguished not only
from the philosophers who dogmatically established truth, but also
from those who dogmatically claimed that truth could not be estab-
lished. Scepticism was thus dynamic rather than static. It refused
to establish its truths as dogma. This perhaps makes no difference,
if the sceptical judgement is always in effect the same as if it were dog-
matic – especially since opponents of scepticism tend to argue it is
dogmatic.99 But it was coherent. Sextus saw that if nothing can be
known, then it cannot be known that nothing can be known. But
he was willing to sacrifice all argument if necessary. He declared
that a bad argument would do as well as a good one for his pur-
poses.100 And he declared that an argument, when used by a
sceptic, was not an argument.101 Which, of course, are maddening
arguments (or whatever they are) for any philosopher committed to
doubt. Williams thought that sceptics were not philosophers at all.
‘Ataraxia followed, for the Pyrrhonists, not on answering fundamen-
tal questions, but on being induced to give up answering them.’102
The sceptical method as Sextus outlined it was simple, although
capable of endless subtlety. It was a method of ‘opposing to every
98 See ibid., 32.
99 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. II, 294, 306.
Diogenes Laertius, op. cit. note 86, 9.102, Vol. II, 513.
100 Sextus Empiricus,Outlines of Pyrrhonism 3.281, in the Loeb edition
trans. R.G. Bury (Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933), 513.
101 ‘When we state … the probable arguments for the non-existence of
the criterion that occur to us, we do indeed state them, but when we do this
we do not add our assent, owing to the fact that the contrary arguments are
equally probable.’ Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, 1.444, in the
Loeb edition trans. R.G. Bury (Camb. Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1935), 239.
102 Williams, op. cit. note 28, 33.
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proposition an equal proposition’.103 If it could be demonstrated that
any proposition and its opposite were of equal value, then there was
no proposition so certain which would not have an opposite equally
certain – that is, not certain at all. If this was so, then therewas no cer-
tainty except the certainty of uncertainty (although Sextus, as we have
seen, tried to avoid putting it this way). The stated purpose of the
sceptics was to achieve, through a suspension of judgement they
called epoché, a state of quietude or imperturbability they called atar-
axia.104 Santayana seemed to think that scepticism would dissolve
words and take us around the compass to something like wonder.
‘The most radical sceptic may be consoled, without being rebuked
or refuted; he may leap at one bound over the whole human tangle
of beliefs and dogmatic claims, elude human incapacity and bias,
and take hold of the quite sufficient assurance that any essence of
ideal quality of being which he may be intuiting has just the character
he is finding in it, and has them eternally.’105
Scepticism is endlessly ambiguous: because what sceptics are
certain of is uncertainty and what they are uncertain of is certainty.
‘Properly speaking’, Hegel declared, ‘it cannot be refuted’.106 Hegel
was perhaps the first in our tradition to recognise that contradictions
are true:
According to Kant, thought has a natural tendency to issue in
contradictions or antinomies, whenever it seems to apprehend
the infinite. But Kant … never penetrated to the discovery of
what the antinomies really and positively mean. The true and
positive meaning of the antinomies is this: that every actual
thing involves a coexistence of opposed elements…107
Scepticism involves the view that human reason breaks down under
extreme conditions – and, in addition, that this fact is a fact of perma-
nent relevance to reason even when we are not reasoning at the limit.
103 Sextus Empiricus, op. cit. note 100, 1.12, 9.
104 Ibid., 1.11, 9. See the summary inMyles Burnyeat, ‘Can the Sceptic
Live with his Scepticism?’, Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic
Epistemology ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, Jonathan Barnes
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 20–53, at 24–5.
105 Santayana, op. cit. note 29, 75.
106 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy trans. E.S.
Haldane & F.H. Simson (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Trübner,
1892–96), Vol. II, 329. There is no equivalent of this line in the recent
edition of the 1825–6 lectures.
107 Hegel, Lesser Logic, 48, quoted in Priest, In Contradiction: A Study
of the Transconsistent 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 1.
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So scepticism has a more capacious logic than doubt. Priest has re-
minded us that
given two states of affairs, there are, in general, four possibilities:
one but not the other holds, vice versa, both or neither. In par-
ticular, given the states of affairs α is true and α is false there
are, without begging any questions, those four possibilities.
But the standard logical theory just assumes that only two of
them should be allowed for. Slightly more liberal views allow
that a third may arise, the neither case.108
But it is the full tetralemma – or, in Sanskrit, catuhskoti –which is the
fundamental structure of all exhaustive arguments. Although the
standard laws of logic apply in relation to ‘finitude’, they do not
explain the infinite, the ultimate, the absolute. In such cases the
laws of identity, contradiction, etc., break down. Then we require a
logic which embraces paradox: because only such a logic can
explain claims of the form that there is ‘a totality Ω, and an object,
o, such that o is and is not in Ω’.109
We find this sort of claim in the Mulamadhyamikakarika of
Nagarjuna, who argued that the ultimate truth is that there is no ulti-
mate truth. The ultimate truth, o, of theworld,Ω, is that ‘everything is
empty’, but if this is true then it is both transcendently and imma-
nently true: that is, in so far as it refers to conventional truths it is
true, but in so far as it refers to its own truth, it establishes its own emp-
tiness, and is neither true nor false.110 The ‘emptiness’which seems to
be the telos of scepticism is distinctive. For whereas wonder, faith and
doubt all postulate a onewhich is a one, scepticism seems to postulate a
onewhich is a nought and is nonetheless a one.Words dissolve, and the
correlative is that the world itself dissolves. And yet both words and
worlds remain. ‘The one and the same reality when viewed through
the category of cause and condition is called the world, and when the
causes and conditions are disregarded it is called nirvana.’111
108 Priest, op. cit. note 93, 4.
109 Ibid., 252. For the opposite claim that the laws of logic have not
begun to work yet since they are not of this world, see S.R.L. Clark,
‘Deconstructing the Laws of Logic’, Philosophy 83 (2008), 25–53.
110 See the discussion of Nagarjuna’s logic in Priest, op. cit. note 93,
263–69.
111 Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamikakarika, 25.9, quoted in Dilip Kumar
Mohanta, Cognitive Scepticism and Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: Punthi
Pustak, 1999), 19.
105
The Four Points of the Compass
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819111000568
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 02 Feb 2017 at 04:37:43, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Through suspension of belief, for Sextus,we achieve ataraxia, which is
both radical denial and radical acceptance of the world. And for
Nagarjuna, we achieve a nirvana which is no more and no less, para-
doxically, than samsara.
The major problem with scepticism is that it is unanswerable in
such a way that it may seem to be a negative replication of faith, an
absolute negation, just as faith is an absolute position. But unlike
faith, it leaves the world undisturbed by words.
5. Conclusion
This has been a short but, I hope, original attempt to see philosophy
in its entirety. It may seem quixotic, or eccentric, a making of arbi-
trary patterns. But it is not. It is the objective embodiment of a
sense that philosophy should not be narrowed to something which
occurs within Fregean or Wittgensteinian or Popperian boundaries.
If ‘philosophy’ stands for only the non-quantitative application of
methods of doubt to the world then so be it: in which case we will
have to find a new word for the compass which, I have argued here,
has wonder, faith, doubt and scepticism at its four points.
Philosophy is a good word for this compass; but another word
could be found if philosophy would no longer do.
The four points of the philosophical compass are:
i. that there is a world and no words to explain it, so that words
and world are part of one undifferentiated reality – and our
response is wonder;
ii. that there is a world, and one word to explain it, which is not
itself of this world, and so explains it on authority – and our
response is faith;
iii. that there is a world, and many words which appear to
explain it, which we, by some method or other, must
examine to establish the certainty we suppose is there –
and our response is doubt;
iv. that there is a world, or worlds, and many words which
appear to explain it, or them, none of which have any
greater authority or reason or status than any other, so
that we are left with uncertainty – and so our response is
scepticism.
As long as we experience wonder, faith, doubt and scepticism we
will have philosophers among us. Nietzsche’s remarkable ‘history
of an error’ in Twilight of the Idols is the story of one man venturing
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through wonder to faith to doubt to scepticism.112 But there is no
‘incipit Zarathustra’ here because I would not suggest that there is a
necessary progression, except logically: and it is likely, anyhow,
that anyonewho ventured through all four would return to the begin-
ning again. Each point seeks an unbroken unity, or certainty,
although each differs about where certainty is to be found. The
world is certainty about itself; or a word is the certainty of
the world; or one word of many is shown to be the certainty of the
world; or words establish only that words cannot express the certainty
of the world. But there is nothing necessary about how any philoso-
pher marks his own compass.
History indicates that all four have been taken seriously at almost all
times. Butmodern academic philosophy, as it has become established
since Descartes, has tended to emphasise the superiority of doubt.
Doubt is delusive: for, when taken alone, it has difficulty demonstrat-
ing the certainties it postulates as necessary. The other three points of
the compass achieve the certainties they offer because their certainties
are strange certainties: the silent certainty of wonder, the absurd cer-
tainty of faith or the paradoxical certainty of scepticism. So the phi-
losopher, if his compass is marked only with doubt, may soon find
himself back in Babel.
Bilkent University, Ankara
jalexand@bilkent.edu.tr
112 Friedrich Nietzsche,Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ trans.
R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 40–1.
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